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A heated discussion about establishing a telecoms regulator has unfolded in
Ukraine. The discussion participants consider it necessary to ensure the
“independence” of such an institute, following Western organisational models.
However, the implications of wholesale copying of Western models onto the
present Ukrainian reality can be inadequate, due to the gross effect from a
number of factors. If we put aside institutional factors, then we can actually
expect negative rather than positive consequences. This issue was evaluated in an
article by ICPS consultant Alex Sundakov, published in the Kyiv Post
Appearances can be deceptive
Debate on the independent regulator
in the Ukrainian telecoms sector
Recent heated political debates about the
“independence” of the proposed National
Commission for Telecommunications
provide an excellent example of how easy
it is to be misled by appearances. The
issues around the creation of a regulatory
agency for the Ukrainian
telecommunications market were reduced
to a battle of labels; “independence” for
such a body along Western organisational
lines was labelled “pro%reform”, while the
alternatives were “anti%reform”. The
rhetoric suggested that only the “forces of
darkness” could be against replicating a
Western model in order to create a
telecommunications market environment
similar to that in developed countries.
The reality, as always, is more complicated.
The lesson is that any institutional reform
must take into account the specifics of
each country, its political and
organisational culture, the legal
environment, and the rules of
accountability. When we consider these, a
Western%style independent regulator is, in
fact, more likely to be “anti%reform” in the
Ukrainian context. The main reason is that
in developed countries, regulatory
“independence” means never to make
decisions without external controls or a
high degree of accountability. In fact, in
most countries, considerable attention is
paid to ensuring that “independent”
regulatory agencies have relatively few
degrees of freedom, that they operate
within tightly defined criteria, and that
they are subject to external oversight. Yet
such constraints are lacking within the
Ukrainian institutional context.
The importance of these constraints
becomes clear when we consider the main
reason for regulatory “independence”.
Regulatory decisions frequently involve
trade%offs between competing commercial
interests—for example, of different
telecommunications operators. It is
important to ensure that a regulator is not
captured by one or another of these
interests. Commercial capture of
regulatory decision making can occur in a
number of ways. One obvious problem is
political interference; if one of the
operators has better access to political
leaders, it may be able to influence
decisions in its favour. This is why it may
be desirable to find some way to insulate
the regulator from day%to%day control by
politicians.
However, commercial capture of the
regulators through the political process is
only one of the risks. Any regulatory body
can be captured through bribes, or through
influence in appointing members of this
“independent” body. In fact, under some
circumstances, too much independence
from political oversight may be a problem
in itself, if political leaders are more
accountable (for example, through public
scrutiny) than the appointed members, and
hence are less prone to capture.
The risk of regulatory capture through
political influence inside the government
needs to be set against the risk of direct
capture of an “independent” regulatory
agency by commercial interests. In
Ukraine’s case, the risk that commercial
interests will exercise influence to appoint
people to an independent agency, and that
such people would then act without any
accountability, must be rated as very high.
Hence, in Ukraine, perhaps more so than in
other countries, it is critically important not
to create an unguided missile out of an
“independent” agency.
What are the requirements for ensuring that
an independent regulatory agency is a
viable option?  As I emphasised above,
“independence” does not mean that such
regulators are free to do whatever they
want. In reality, independent regulators in
most countries operate under very tight
constraints; they are given detailed and
precise criteria for making decisions, they
follow prescribed processes, and they are
tightly held to account, including rights of
appeal. The only independence they
exercise is in judging how the circumstances
of each particular case compare against the
pre%determined standards.
The criteria for regulatory decisions must be
transparent, well understood, and set out in
legislation. The regulator must be provided
with clear instructions that specify the
objectives of regulation, the methodology to
be followed, the criteria for evaluating
information that may be supplied to the
regulator, and the standards of information
and analysis necessary for making decisions.
For example, with regard to price regulation,
laws dealing with the telecommunications
sector in most countries specify that prices
for regulated services are to be set equal to
the long%run incremental costs of providing
these services. The long%run incremental
cost concept is very specific, and there is a
well%established and reasonably objective
methodology for calculating such costs. In
other words, an independent regulator is
given very precise guidance.
 The area of competence of an
“independent” regulator must also be very
specific, and narrowly defined. For example,
in most countries, telecommunications
regulators are given a narrow list of
services whose prices they can regulate, and
a law change is required to change that list.
Forthcoming elections in Ukraine
are expected to ameliorate economic policy
This is necessary to manage the risk of
empire building by regulators.
Moreover, the decision%making process must
be carefully designed to ensure fairness and
to prevent regulatory capture. For example,
most countries specify detailed procedures
for price regulation. The details differ from
country to country, but the basic outline is
broadly similar. The regulator first issues
guidelines outlining its approach and
information requirements. All market
participants are given an opportunity to
comment. The regulator then calls for
submissions on the specific level of prices
that should be set. All market participants
are again allowed to present submissions.
The regulator then issues a draft decision.
Finally, all market participants are allowed
to respond before the full determination is
made. While this may seem slow and
cumbersome, a process of this kind is
necessary to ensure the quality of the
decision.
Perhaps most importantly, while an
independent regulatory agency should be
insulated from day%to%day political
pressures, it must have a clear
accountability regime. The most common
accountability tool used in such cases is the
right of appeal to court. Any market
participant can ask the court to consider
whether the regulator complied with its
criteria, whether it followed a fair process
and took all relevant information into
account, and whether it made any mistakes
in assessing the specifics of the case.
There can be no doubt that the parliamentary elections will alter national
economic policy, which will crucially depend on the parties that will sit in
parliament. Generally speaking, we expect the new convocation of the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine to come up with a more effective economic policy. At a meeting of
the European Business Association, ICPS expert Hlib Vyshlinsky presented a forecast
of the implications from the Verkhovna Rada elections for Ukraine’s economy
Policymaking entails a sequence of
measures aimed at accomplishing public
goals. According to this criterion, we can
maintain that Ukrainian parties have never
yet produced any consistent policy vision for
consideration of the Ukrainian public.
Moreover, there has been a lack of concrete
measures designed to achieve the targeted
goals in existing party programs. In
particular, the public%at%large and business
representatives are not allowed to control
parties’ activities or to influence them
between elections.
Under these circumstances, declared party
visions regarding economic policy can be
overhauled once the party is installed in
the parliament. Party programs do not
furnish any exhaustive replies to questions
about future party policy, either. So, we
can only be guided by the reputation and
the current activities of the party leaders.
Such ambiguity breeds uncertainty as to
future policy, and this makes it really
complicated to forecast the impact of
parliamentary elections on economic
policy.
In any party’s platform, the proposed
economic policy can be judged by the
following criteria: (1) ideologies respected
by the party; and (2) interests lobbied by
the party.
Determining the principal frameworks of
economic policy largely depends what
ideology the party pursues—communist or
liberal. These ideologies can be weighed
against the following set of criteria:
• role of the state in the economy;
• attitudes to private entrepreneurship;
• share of GDP re%allocated by the State
Budget.
As far as interests lobbied by the party, are
concerned, they can be assessed using a
conventional scale, where one end is public
interests and the other is private interests.
The more a party’s proposed policy covers
“public” interests, the bigger share of
societal groups benefits, and vice versa. In
order to determine the extent of “social
responsiveness” of interests, we can use the
following set of criteria:
• party position towards how rigidly the law
should regulate the activities of government
authorities;
• support or rejection of transparent
procedures of adopting government
decisions;
• attitude to barter transactions.
We expect that the future Verkhovna Rada
will be less affected by Communist ideology
than it used to be. Nevertheless, parties for
whom the public interest is a priority will
still have a majority representation in the
Parliament of the new convocation.
We expect the future parliament of Ukraine
to be more accountable. A particular feature
of the current election campaign is that the
mass media has given more airtime to
evaluating and delivering to voters the
election platforms of parties involved, first of
all through televised debates. Under these
circumstances, parties elected to the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine will have to abide
more diligently by their declared goals.
The above factors should enhance the quality
of economic policy in Ukraine. Namely, we
expect that such a positive change will spur
Ukraine’s economic growth to 5.5% in 2003
(for 2002, the forecasted GDP growth is
4.5%).!
For further information, please contact Hlib
Vyshlinsky at tel. (38)044) 463)6337,
e)mail: hlib@icps.kiev.ua.
None of the above preconditions for the
“independence” of regulatory bodies is
present in Ukraine. In their absence, an
organisation that looks like its Western
counterpart is likely to bring about quite
different outcomes. Without the
institutional context, the adoption of the
appearances of the Western model will do
more harm than good, and the risk of
regulatory capture will rise.!
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